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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
GEORGE A. SIMS, M. K. SIMS, 
ELMER L. SIMS AND G. GRAN(' 
SIMS, d/b/a SALT LAKFj 
TRANSFER COMPANY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 
OF UTAH AND MAGNA-
GARFIELD TRUCK LINE, a 
corporation, 
Defendants. 
CASE No. 7377 
BRTF,F 01~ DEFJ<~NDAN1'~ 
NUPPJ ... J;jl\iJ;~N'l'AL Wl'A'l'l~jJ\J EN'I' OF F AC'rEi 
'l'he statPnwnt of facts eontai1w<l in plaintiffs' hri<'i' 
fails to sPt forth eertain PvidPnrP \'ital to the rights in 
t lwsp IH"O<'P<'dings of dE~fendant ::\1 agna-Ga rl'i<~ld 'I' ruck 
Line. It is, therefore, dePnwd neeessary to suppl<'ment 
plaintiffs' statement of facts, in order to prrsPnt to tlw 
Court the full fon•p of tlw PvidPn<'<~ n•<•Pi VPd h.v tlw 
Public Surviee Commission, upon whi<'h it tltmiP<l plain-
tiffs' application for a contract carrier's permit. 
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The defendant Magna-Garfield Truck Line is a con-
solidated corporation organized and existing under and 
by virtue of the laws of the State of Utah, consisting of 
two former corporations organized and existing under 
the laws of the State of Utah, known and designated as 
Magna-Garfield Truck Line and Salt Lake & Bingham 
Freight Lines. The said defendant received its Certifi-
cate of Incorporation from the Secretary of State of 
Utah on the 31st day of December, 1946. (R. 113, 114) 
Salt Lake & Bingham Freight Lines (being one of the 
consolidating corporations as aforesaid) was the owner 
and holder as a common motor carrier of property in 
intra-state commerce of the following Certificates of 
Convenience and Necessity issued by the Public Service 
Commission of U.tah (R. 115): 
Certificate Case 
No. Date No. 
296 April 21, 1927 963 
65R April 23, 1945 2R33 
Said Magna-Garfield Truck Line (being also one of the 
consolidating corporations as aforesaid) was the owner 
and holder as a common motor carrier of property in 
intra-state commerce of the following Certificate of 
·Convenience and Necessity issued by the Public Service 
Commission of Utah (R. 114, 115): 
Certificate 
No. 
262 
Date 
March 6, 1946 
Case 
No. 
847 
In a proc~x~ding instFuted before t 11e P·:blic Serv~ce> 
Commission of Utah on the 5th day of February, 1947, 
by said defendant company, in the matter of the applica-
tion of Magna-Garfield Truck Line, a consolidated corpo-
ration of Magna-Garfield Truck Line and Salt Lake & 
Bingham Freight Lines, designated No. 3092, the said 
Commission, by order dated the 6th day of May, 1947 
(R. l13, 118) did cancel and annul Certificate of Conven-
iene(~ and Necessity No. 262, issued to said Magna-Gar-
field Truck Line (being one of the consolidating corpo-
rations) in Case No. 847, and Certificates of Conveniencf~ 
and· Necessity Nos. 296 and 658 issued to Salt Lake & 
Bingham Freight Lines (heing one of the consolidating 
corporations) in Cases Nos. 963 and 2833, and in lieu 
thereof said Commission issued unto defendant company 
Certificate of Convenience and Necessity No. 771 (R.113) 
to operate as common motor carrier for the transporta-
tion of commodities generally from Salt Lake City, Utah, 
to Garfield, Utah, over United States Highway No. 91 to 
junction with United States Highway No. 50, thence 
over United States Highway No. 50 and return over the 
same route, including all intermediate points and off-
route point of Bacchus, Utah; and from Salt Lake City, 
Utah, to West Jordan, South Jordan, Riverton, Bluff-
dale, Herriman and Bingham, Utah, over United States 
Highway No. 91 and State and County roads and return, 
including all intermediate points, except that no service 
was authorized on United States Highway No. 91 between 
33rd South St. and Sandy, Utah, including Midvale, Utah. 
Acting under and by virtue of the authority con-
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tain'ed in and incidental to said Certificate of Convenience 
and Necessity No. 771 as aforesaid, defendant Magna-
Garfield Truck Line (the consolidated corporation) has 
continuously since the 6th day of May, 1947, operated 
as a common carrier for the transportation of commodi-
ties generally over and upon the aforesaid routes de-
scribed in said Certificate of Convenience and N ecessitv. 
. . 
(R. 140, 141, J42) 
The defendant Magna-Garfield Truck Line has in 
all respects and particulars complied with the terms, 
eonditions and restrictions contained in said Certificate 
of Convenience and Necessity ( R. 140) and in particular 
said defendant has maintained on file with the aforesaid 
Commission all insurance required by Jaw, and all tariff!';, 
containing complete information as to rates, rules, regu-
lations and schedules. (R. 140) Said defendant has 
operated as a common motor carrier of commodities 
over the aforesaid routes at all times in accordance with 
the statutes of the State of Utah and the rules and regula-
tions of the Public Service Commission of Utah existing 
on the date of said Certificate of Convenience and N ec-
essity, and which were thereafter prescribed by sairl 
Commission, governing the operations of common motor 
carriers over the public highways of the State of Utah. 
( R. 140) 
For a long time prior to the granting of said Certifi-
cate of Convenience and Necessity No. 771, the two con-
solidating corpo~ations aforesaid (predecessors of this 
defendant) opei·ated over the aforesaid routes described 
in the aforesaid Certificate ·Of Convenienae and Necessity, 
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as common motor carriers of commodities generally, an.l 
rendered unto the publie reasonably adequate and con-
tinuous servie{~ as such carriers. ( R. 114, 115, 141) Na~d 
defendant, as the consolidated corporation, ha~ contimwd 
said operation, and has fulfilled all requirements of law 
and all of the requirements and regulations of the afore-
said Public Service Commission in the aforesaid opera-
tions. (R. 140, 141) The said defendant has operated 
upon a regular schedule, averaging three truck move-
ments per day from Salt Lake City to Bingham and 
Lark and return. (R. 142, 153) The sa:id defendant 
company owns four trucks capable of handling five 
tons, or 10,000 pounds each, three trucks capable of han-
dling ten tons, or 20,000 pounds each, one pickup truck, 
and one ten-ton semi-trailer. (R. 142) It has twelve 
employees, six of whom are regularly employed as truck 
drivers. ( R. 143, 155) Two of its shop men are also 
qualified truck drivers, and can be used in emergency 
to drive trucks. ( R. 155) Its trucks are capable of han-
dling 100,000 pounds of commodities per- day. ( R. 145) 
It is able to rent trucks for operations in excess of its 
normal operations or scheduled runs. (R. 145) All equip-
ment is in "A-1 condition". (R. 144) 
The West Jordan plant of Utah-Idaho Sugar Com-
pany is located about ten miles south of Salt Lake City, 
on Redwood Road. The factory itself stands about two 
or three blocks from the highway. (R. 142) The defend-
ant company operates its scheduled freight service over 
Redwood Road from Salt Lake City to Binghar:1 and 
Lark. (R. 142) 'l'lw (l0f0ndant company has tahn car0 
;) 
• 
of all requests made by the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company 
to move sugar from West Jordan to Salt Lake City, with 
one exception. (R. 144) This exception involved a tele-
phone cal'i in the late afternoon, whereby the Sugar 
Company requested a truck at its \Vest Jordan plant 
within one-half hour. The defendant company informed 
the Sugar Company that it would provide a truck within 
two hourioi, which still permitted the movement of the 
sugar into Salt Lake City the same day. (R. 144) This 
episode occurred during the peak season of sugar haul-
age in .June. • (R. 144) The handling of sugar does not 
require any unusual or extraordinary equipment othe-:.· 
than it must be of such nature as to keep the sugar dry. 
(R. 107, 146) The equipment of the defendant Magna-
Garfield Truck Line is of that nature, four trucks being 
closed trucks. (R. 146) Said defendant has handled both 
l.t.l. shipments and t.l. shipments, some of the shipments 
being from the Sugar Factory to towns served directly 
by said defendant. 'l'hese shipments were usually small--
5 to 10 bags each. (H. 110, 146) Said defendant company 
has also moved some truckload shipments from \Vest 
.Jordan to Security Warehouse in Salt Lake and to candy 
companies. (R. 147) rr'hese shipments occurred only dur-
ing the peak season, which is the canning season. (R. 147) 
Said defendant is able to handle all peak sugar movements 
(R. 150) and if the movement of more than 1,000 bags a 
day is required, said defendant is in a position to buy 
more trucks or rent trucks to take care of the emergency. 
(R. 151) 
The Utah-Idaho Nugar Company offered no criticism 
ti 
of the handling of its shipments by the defendant com-
pany, nor did it make any criticism of its automotive 
equipment. (R. 106) The service rendered it by defendant 
company has been very satisfactory. (R. 106) It sup-
ported plaintiffs' application for a contract carrier per-
mit because it desired speedy service rather than "emer-
gency" service. (R. 103, 107) The defendant company 
has never refused the Sugar Company common carrie~· 
service. (R. 103) 
The plaintiffs prior to the filing of their application 
for a contract carrier's permit in the instant case had 
served Utah-Idaho Sugar Company under a "purported 
oral agreement". (R. 70, 71, 73, 75; 92, 102) They 
rendered such service without any formal authority from 
the Public Service Commission. (R. 84) 
The following colloquy between Mr. Donald Hacking, 
Chairman of the Public Service Commission of Utah, 
and Mr. Elmer L. Sims, a witness for the plaintiffs, is 
pertinent: 
"CoM. HAcKING: As I understand your testi-
mony, you have rendered this service to the Utah-
Idaho Sugar Company at We::;t .Jordan for ::;orne 
consi(lerahle period of time? 
A. Yes. 
CoM. l:IACKING: An<l are still rendering it. As 
you stated, yon sent a truc·k out yesterday '1 
A. Yes. 
CoM. HACKING: Now, under what claim or 
authority have you been rendering this servicE\ 
since the effective day of the 194-5 Amendment to 
the Motor Carrier Act, excluding from the ('Xemp-
7 
tion the eontraet hauls iifteeu mlles beyond the 
city limits'! 
A. Well, I thought that we automatically had 
the right to continue doing the type of business 
we were prior to 1945; that if we were operating 
as a contract carrier permit prior to that time, wu 
could continue to operate. 
CoM. HACKING: That is, you had the view that 
you would have that authority automaCcally, 
without any specific written authority from this 
Commission~ 
A. I thought we could continue it, see. 
<..;oM. HAcKDrG: Has the Commission, through 
its enforrement department, questioned that au-
thority and che<'ked yon on that? 
A. They have nevPr questioned us on this 
\\'est .Jordan haul. I heliev<' the Commission has 
known for quite a period of time, we were hauling 
this sugar. As a matter of faet, I filed a contract 
with you. No one seem:,; to be ahle to find it, but, 
if l remember correctly, I filed the contract with 
the Commission ahnost a ypar ago. 
CoM. HACKING: Isn't it a fact, Elmer, that 
yon have procured temporary authorities from 
time to time in some of these ea:,;es, where there 
has heen a hig movenH•nt of sup;ar, to make the 
haul? 
A. Yes sir, we have. From Ogden and Lehi. 
CoM. HACKING: Have yon P\'er from West 
.To rda n '? 
A. I don't believe so." (R. 84, 85) 
Also, the following part of the testimony of Mr. 
George A. Sims, a witness on behalf of plaintiffs, given 
on direct examination is extremely rel<•vant: 
"Q. Mr. Sims, this is an application relative 
to a contract carrier authority to operate for and 
on behalf of the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company be-
tween West Jordan and Salt Lake City. Will 
you state how long you have l~ngaged in that 
type of operation'? 
A. Well, we have been hauling for the Sugar 
Company haek as far as 1 can remember, and 
that would lw in '85, 1935. And we have produced 
evidence at our !waring when we applied for our 
rightR, and the Commission said we were not only 
common carriers for rertain article!', but we were 
a contract carrier and we were givPn the rights 
to be a contract carrier at that time. 
Q. Directing your attention to the year 1940, 
were you, during 1940 and prior thereto, engaged 
as a contract carrier, by verbal contract, with the 
Utah-Idaho Sugar Company in transporting their 
commodities between West Jordan and Salt Lake~ 
A. Yes; we made an agreement with them 
to haul-
MR. RITER: I am going to object to that ques-
tion, and I am doing it for the purpose of the 
record here. • * * 
CoM. HAcKING: The objection will he over-
ruled. 
MR. PuGSLEY: You may answer. 
'I' HE vVITNESS: Repeat that question: 
(Question read.) 
A. Yes sir, and since that time. 
Q (By Mr. Pugsley). Since that time have 
you served them under this oral arrangement, 
from time to tinw? 
A. Yes, when ever they nPf~rlPu us." ( R. 65, 
66, 67) 
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~Ir. UeorgP A. Sint~ al~o t~~~tified 011 ero;;;;;;-examina-
1ion in part a;;; l"ollo\\·;;;: 
"Q. \\'pJl now, you Ul'<'d a clau;,;e here on a 
~tatement, that interested me very much, in testi-
l'ying as to yom ~ervice to the Utah-Idaho Sugar 
Company. You :mid, '\Vhene\'Pl' they needed it'. 
As a matter of faet, your practice has been 
that when thP Sugar Company called up you 
l"PSpondPd with Ollf~ 0 j' your trw~ks, didn't yon? 
A. Y(•s ~ir. 
0. And you made your arrangement then and 
there as to what the rate would be? 
A. 'l'hey already had our price we were work-
mg for. 
Q. You had discussed the prices, what you 
\\'<•rP \\'orking for, fil'P\'iously1 
A. ()]J yP:-:. 
(~. But so l'n r a;;; tl1P imnwdiatv anangement 
went, it was principally by telephone, I assume'? 
A. AttN till~ first arrangement was mad·~ 
\\'itll tht>Jll, ,\'Pi' :-:ir. 
Q. \V!'ll, what do you mr:an b)' 'an oral agrec•-
llH~nl ', tlJPII! 
A. By an oral agn~emenl is when' yon go 
:-;ee a firm, and thPy ask yon what you would haul 
---how ntueh a hnndred pounds )'OU would haul 
l'r0111 a <'(•rtain pni11t to a c-<,rtain point, ba:-:ed on 
a quantii)r or :-;o muelt. 
Q. Well, Mr. Sims, \\'h(•n yon examined tlw 
record in your cas(~---)'Oll J'l'(~aH your case that 
made a lot of law for us, that went to the Ruprenw 
Court'! 
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A. Yes, it went to the Supreme Court twice. 
Q. Yes, it went to the Supreme Court twice, 
and when you examined the Public Service Com-
mission's record in that case, you recall-when 
the permit as contract carrier was issued to you 
there was six different firms specified you would 
serve? 
A. Yes, sir, but I was given the impression 
that all that was necessary after we were given 
the rights of a contract carrier, all we would 
have to do was file another contract, and it would 
automatically go into effect. rrhat was the under-
standing of why they gave us this as a contract 
carrier. 
Q. All right. Yon could read the orders of the 
Commission in that respect, couldn't you? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. And you know that-what those orders 
specified, didn't you-in detail the Commission 
pursued that matter, and very carefully enumer-
ated the concerns for which you could carry as 
contract carried 
MR. PuGsLEY: \V ell, just one moment. I object 
i o this as calling for a legal conclusion, and, fur-
tlH~r, the fact that the Commission will take judi-
cial notice of the fact that this sugar factory is 
within the fifteen-mile zone which was exempt 
at the time this former order was issued. ~, 'x * 
CoM. lTAcin~<:: rPhe objection will bf~ over-
rnled. 
A. I thought I knew, but the thing has b<~<'n 
twisted around now so T don't know wlwn~ T am at. 
11 
(,~. \V ell, Mr. ::-;ims, as a matter of fairness 
to you, would you like to see the copy of the 
arnPnded order of the Commission on the 23nl 
of February, l 939, in Case 1849 '? * * * 
A. lt is emw No. 1849. Yes, I have read it. 
Q. (By Mr. Riter): You don't notice the 
name of the Utah-Idaho Sugar in there, do yon'? 
A. No sir. 
Q. ·were you hauling for the Utah-Idaho 
Sugar at that time? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. Do yon want to go haek there and read 
the whole opinion of the Commi:-;sion on there, 
where they define the difference between the con-
tract earriers and eommon earriers? 
A. T think I know. 
Q. You think you knoV.' that'? 
"\. Right. 
Q. Then you recall what the Commission told 
you at that time was the exact difference between 
the two, and they definPd it 1 
A. [ think 1 could defme it. 
Q. My point is this, after that extensive liti-
g;:ttion which yon took to the Supreme Court 
twiee, and after these elaborate proceedings be-
fon' the Public Serviee Commission, all of which 
you WPn• informed of because you paid for, of 
conr·se-now I want to kno\Y why, in face of that, 
did .\'Oll ignore this Utah-Idaho Sugar situation? 
:\lR. PuusLEY: T objeet to that, as no evidence 
in the reeord he haR ignored the Utah-Idaho 
situation at all. 
MR. RITER: Perhaps the best way right now 
1s to withdraw. 
I expected Mr. Pugsley would introduce into 
this hearing these basic proceedings that enter 
relevantly into any consideration of this. Are 
you going to introduce them in evidence7 
MR. PuGSLEY: I am not. 
MR. RITER: Will you take judicial notice of• it? 
CoM. HACKING: Mr. Riter, is West Jordan 
within fifteen miles of Salt Lake City limits? 
MR. RITER: Yes, it is. 
MR. PuGSLEY: Yes sir. 
CoM. HACKING: Well, at that time the Salt 
Lake Transfer could have served West Jordan 
without any authority. 
MR. RITER: Under the old law. 
CoM. HACKING: Under the old law. 
Mn. PuGSLEY: That's right. 
CoM. HACKING: That is, at the time this report 
and order was made and issued by the Commis-
sion, there was no particular need to consider the 
\Vest .Jordan movement, was there? 
~ln. RlTErr: Ex(~ept this, that this ·whole mat-
ter of thPir contract earrier status vvas being 
considered by the Commission, and Mr. Sims has 
testifiPd that at that time they wen~ serving Utah-
Idaho Sugar Company, and what I want to know 
is why, in view of these plenary proceedings that 
were before this Commission and beforr tlw 
Supreme Court, why at that time thii'i Utah-Idaho 
Sugar situation wasn't brought to the attPntion 
of the Commission J 
CoM. l-L'\CKING: Can yon answer that, Mr. 
Sims 'f 
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"\. Yes sir. Th(~I'P was a <·lausP in the Jmy 
that we wPre orwrating- undPr then that we had <l 
right to take eare of int(~l'llrhan delivery of g'Pil-
PI'al f'Ommodities anywhen' within a radius oJ' 
fifteen miles of the eity limits, and that wasn't 
only for one finn, but that was a Stah~-wid,• 
Pxemption, so that a man living in the countr:f 
eould deliver something- ovPr tift<~ell miles to ;i 
llPighbor in town, and like\visP, lwn•, and WP 
operated nndPJ' that. f helped put the <'lanse in.'' 
(R. 70-7G) 
The plaintiffs are the owners and holders of CPrtiiieate 
of Convenience aml Nt>ceBsity No. 012 dated .January Hl, 
1939. (R. 119, 135) This Certificate rwrmits them to trails-
port in intra-state connnerce commodities \Vhich by rea-
son o[ tlwir size, shape, weight, origin or destination 
requin; speeial equipmPnt or :-i<'rYi<'e ot' a eharaeter rwt 
regularly furnished by eommon carriers at regular Jim~ 
rates; commodities in connection with the transportation 
of which is rendered a special serviee in preparing such 
commodities for shipment or setting up after delivery, 
or otherwise rendering a ;service not a part of ordinary 
aet of tnw:-;portation, and not regularly furnished by 
other common carriers; and camp site equipment. (R. 135, 
137) Plaintiffs are also the holders of contract t~arrier 
permit No. 212 (amended) dated February 23, 193}1, 
issued in Case ~ o. 1849 (R. 73, 125, 12f.i, 132) wherein 
the plaintiffs are authorizPd to transport certain speci-
fied pnlperty for six idtmtified eonLractees (none of whom 
u as tl1 e U tal1-f ifalw 8uga1· Co Jn)Wf!J/) over several separ-
ate routes in the State of Utah. (R 73, 75) 
14 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE PLAINTIFFS WERE NOT ENTITLED 
AS A MATTER OF RIGHT TO A CONTRACT 
CARRIER PERMIT UNDER THE SO-CALLED 
"GRANDFATHER" RIGHT AS PROVIDED BY 
SECTION 76-5-21, UTAH CODE 1943, AS AMEND-
ED BY LAWS OF UTAH 1945, CHAPTER 105, 
SECTION 3, PAGE 209. 
Section 76-5-21 Utah Code 1943, as amended by Laws 
of Utah, 1945, Chapter 105, Section 3, Page 209, was 
operative on the date of the application of plaintiffs for 
a contract carrier pPrmit. The present statute reads as 
follows: 
76-3-21. 
"It shall be unlavvful for any contract nwtor 
carrier to operate as a carrier in intrastate com-
merce without having first obtained from the 
commission a permit therefor. The Commission 
shall grant on application to any applicant who 
was a contract motor carrier as defined by this 
act on the 1st day of January, 1940, a permit to 
operate as a contract motor carrier on the saml'-
highways and to carry on the same type of motor 
service as he was on said date. 
"The commission upon the filing of an appli-
cation for a contract motor carrier's penr1it shall 
fix a time and place for hearing thereon and may 
give the same notice as provided in section 76-5-18 
hereof. If, from aU the testimony offered at said 
hearing, the commission shall determine that the 
highways over which the applicant desires to 
operate are not unduly burdened; that the grant-
ing of the application will not unduly interfen: 
with the traveling public; and that the granting 
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of Uw appLication will not be detrimental to the 
best interests of the people of the state of Utah 
and/ or to the localities to be served, and if the 
existing transportation facilities do not provide 
adequate or rmtsonable serviee, tlw commission 
shall grant such permit.'' 
'!'he plaintiffs assign as error the action of the Com-
mission in refusing to grant plaintiffs a contract carrier 
permit to haul sugar between \Vest Jordan and Salt Lab~ 
City, Utah, for tlw Ctah-Idaho Sugar Company. l<'unda-
mentally, this daim of error it> hat->ed upon tltn purported 
''grandfather'' dause eontained in the abovp quoted 
statute, and n~ading at-> follows: 
'' 'l'ht• eonunission :,;hall grant on applieation 
to any applieant who was a contract motor carrier 
as dt>fined by thi:,; ad on thn h:t day of January, 
1940, a IH:'l'Hiit to operat(~ as a eontract motor car-
ri<>r en thP sHill(' highways and to carry on the 
snmP typP ol' motor service as he was on said 
date." 
Ac·cording to plaintiffs' contention, this permit should 
have issued to the plaintiffs as a matter of right upon 
their showing that on the 1st day of January, 1940, they 
were operating as a contract carrier for the Utah-Idaho 
Sugar Company on the public highway between \V e:st 
,Jordan and Salt Lake City, Utah. 
'I'he irnmediat(• aHtecedent of the present statute is 
Section 9 of Chapter 65, Laws of Utah, 1935, which reads 
in pertinent part as follows: 
Hit shall be unlawful for any contract motor 
carrier to operate as a carrier in trastate com-
merce without having first ohtail1f~d from the com-
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mission a permit therefor. The commission shall 
grant on application to any applicant who was a 
contract motor carrier as defined by this act on 
the fifteenth day of March, 1933, a permit to 
operate as a contract motor carrier on the same 
highways and to carry on the same type of motor 
service as he was prior to said date. Where said 
applicants were operating on all the highways 
of the state prior to said date, the permit shall 
authorize them to continue to operate on all of 
said highways. The commission shall further-
more grant on application to any applicant who 
received a permit to operate as a. contract motor 
carrier between the fifteenth day of March, 1933, 
and the date on which this act takes effect, a 
permit to continue to operate in the same manner 
and over the same highways as the terms of said 
permit allowed. 
"The commission upon the filing of an applica-
tion for a contract motor carrier's permit by any 
other person than those referred to above in this 
section shall fix a time and place for hearing there-
on and shall give the same notice as provided in 
section 6 hereof. * * * If, from all the testimony 
offered at said hearing, the commission shall 
determine that the highways over which the appli-
cant desires to operate are not unduly burdened: 
that the granting of the application will not unduly 
interfere with the traveling public; and that the 
granting of the application will not be detrimental 
to the best interests of the people of the state 
of Utah and/ or to the localities to be served, tlw 
commission shall grant such permit; "' * "''' 
(Italics supplied) 
A comparison of the law under which plaintiffs made 
their application on November 10, 1947, with the relevant 
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]Jl'O\'lSlOllS oJ' ihe 19::;5 statuU• [a~;f; abovP ljUOted, dearly 
shows that the Legislaiur<', in pl'O\'idiHg for tlw "grand-
father" rights, intended to modi(v in a radical manner 
the provisions of the prior law. In order to understand 
this ehange, it is lH'CCssary to ref(~r to the case of 111 c-
('arthy 1:. P1tblic Service Commission of Utah, 94 Ut. 
:~04, 77 Pac. 2d 331. 'l'his decision, in interpreting See-
tion 9 of Chapter Gfi, T ... aws of Vtah, H)35, took note of 
the fact that the statute made no provision for notice 
and hearing in tlw granting of <~ontract carrier permits 
under the "grandfather" clause, hut that the application 
for snrh permit by an:· other contract motor carrier, viz. 
nP\\'-comer's in th(~ eontract motor bw.;iness, should be 
snt for hearing at a titllP and plaee fixed hy the Com-
mission, and notieP lw giv<m to all advPnwly intereste<l 
in the same. 'l'h<• "grandfather" <'lanse of this statutt' 
fanJred two classes: (a) thosp vdw WPJ'e eontract ear-
riPrs as defined b:v· Ht<> aet nn Mareh 15, 1933, and (b) 
those who reeeiV('d a rwrmit as contraet carrier after 
1\farch 15, 1933 and Jwl'ore the> (•ffeetive date of Chapt<u· 
G5 (Deeemlwr 31, 1935). 'l'h<> Court, however, spr~cifically 
declined t<\ tweept the literal reading of the ~tatute, 
m;iug this languagr·: 
''But it \Vas never intended by the Legislature 
that these permits issued un~der the act to existing 
oi· antecedent contract carriers without a hearing 
or notice to others, should be conclusive and bind-
ing determinations of the right of such permittt'.e::; 
to operate thereunder, or to perform any other or 
different service than specified therein or even the 
class of service therein stated. In the nature of 
the case, such permits can only operate as prima 
lS 
facie evidence of the right of the permittee to 
operate thereunder. Least of all, can it be proper-
ly said that such a permit, issued upon applica-
tion, excludes the right of a competitor to contend 
and to show to the Commission by protest, objec-
tion, or otherwise that the permittee in his opera-
tions thereunder has exceeded the limits or 
character of service permitted thereby, and has 
entered into regular competition with-let us say 
-common motor carriers; that the permittee is 
holding himself out to the public as equipped, 
ready, and willing to accept loads wherever and by 
whomsoever tendered; or that he has provided 
himself with equipment for use in hauling loads 
that unduly injure the highway, the public, and all 
competitors; or that he is hauling regularly over 
highways not specified in his permit. These and 
many like subjects of inquiry might be suggested. 
In any such case it would be the Commission's 
duty to receive and file the complaints or objec-
tions made and to order a hearing to determine 
the truth of the matter, notwithstanding that a 
permit had already issued to the contract carrier 
in question. This is not unfair to the latter, 
for, had the permittee desired a permit or a 
certificate of necessity that would be conclusive 
and binding upon all comers, he had it in his 
power to request a hearing of the Commission 
and notice to all adversely concerned before tlw 
issuance or acceptance of the permit. Upon con-
stitutional principles the applicant eannot expect 
a conclusive or binding determination upon an 
ex parte application. Least of all, can he expeet 
that persons adversely affected by his application 
shall be held bound or affected by mere self-
serving declarations or statements contained in 
his application for a permit." ( pp. 33G-337 of 
i7 Pac. 2d) 
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As the 1"fcCarthy case, supra, points out, a distinc-
tion was made by the statute between applicants comin~ 
mHler thP ''grandfather'' clause and those who applied 
for a permit who WPn' not within the preferred classe2. 
Plaintiff:-:' argnmPnt wonlcl find weight had the 1935 
statute bPc~n in orwration at t!w time their application 
with whieh the Court i::; now concemed was filed. 
When refPrence i::; made to Section 76-5-21 Utah 
Code 1943, as amended by Laws of Utah 1945, it will be 
seen that the Legislature radically changed the practice 
in this regard. rrhe statute, after providing that a con-
tract motor c-arrier on the first da)' of ,January, 1940, 
should he granted a permit, directs: 
'' 1'he Commission upon the filing of an appli-
cation for a contract motor carrier's permit shall 
fix a time and place for hearing thereon and may 
give the same notice as provided in Section 
76-5-18 hereof. If, from all the testimony offered 
at said hearing, the commission shall determine 
that the highways over which the applicant desires 
to operate are not unduly burdened; that the 
granting of the applic-ation will not unduly inter-
fere with the traveling public; and that the grant-
ing of the application will not be detrimental to 
the best interests of the peopJp of the state of 
lJtah and/or to the localities to be served, and 
if the existing transportation facilities do not pro-
. \'ide a(lequatf' or reasonable service, the com-
lllission shall gra11t Sll('h permit." 
( \m1pare thP eorrrlative provisions of Chapter 65, Laws 
ol' Utah 19:1;5, whid1read: 
• • 'I' he ('OJmnis;.;ion, upon the filing of an appli-
c-ation fo1· a eontraet motor carrier's permit by 
;.!I) 
any other person than those referred to above, 
etc.," (Italics supplied) 
with the provisions of Section 76-5-21 Utah Code 194;), 
as amended by the La_ws of Utah of 1945, and it will be 
thus seen that in the 1945 act the legislature purposely 
eliminated the phrase "by any other person than those 
referred to above in this section," and added the words 
''and if the existing transportation facilities do not pro-
vide adequate or reasonable service.'' 'l'his change in 
phraseology clearly expresses an intent on the part of 
the legislature that the practice of granting ''grand-
father" permits without notice would thereafter be elimi-
nated, and that all applications, whether under the 
"grandfather" preference or without the preference, 
should be set for hearing, and notice thereof should be 
given to interested parties. The McCarthy decision, 
supra, was announced on March 12, 1938. It undoubtedly 
influenced the form of the 1945 amendment. 
It is manifest that the Court is now required to con-
strue Section 76-5-21 Utah Code 1943, as amended by 
Laws of Utah 1945, inasmuch as there exists on the face 
of the statute an apparent contradiction. By the first 
paragraph, the Commission is directed to grant on ap-
plication to any applicant who was a contract motor 
carrier as defined by the act on January 1, 1940, a per-
mit to operate as a contract motor carrier on the same 
highways and to carry on the same type of motor serviee 
as he was on said date. By the second paragraph ol' 
said section, the Commission is directed upon the filing 
of an application for a contract motor carrier's permit 
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to li:--; a t imP and phH·e o\' lwaring th<·reon, and to glV<~ 
notiee then•of. It may UKe tlw method of notice provided 
in Sertion 76-5-18 Ftah Code 1943. Hovvcver, notic<~ iu 
wme form must lw ginn. It is th<~n provided that if the 
Commission ;,:hall deterlllillP "from all thP tPstimony of-
fen'd at ~aid hearing" that four enumerated conditions 
arP sho\vn to Pxist, that a permit shall issue. A literal 
reading of this ~tatute produces confusion and contra-
diction. 'l'hp ::-;ection, after directing that an applicant who 
was a contraet motor eanier on ,January 1, 1940, shall re-
ceive a rwrmit to op(~ratc as ::-;ueh motor earrier, then pro-
vides that the Commission ~:;hall hold a hearing after 
notice, and receive evidence, and if sueh evidence meets 
the conditions named, it shall grant a permit. If the con-
struction is adopted such as the literal rrading of the stat-
ute suggests, then the "grandfath0r" elause is wholly 
destroyed. lt is not lJcLievecl that ~:mch construction or 
interpretation of the statute would carry out the legisla-
tive intent. Therefore, the task devolves upon the Court 
to discover, if possible, a construction of the statute which 
will give full weight to all its parts, eliminate absurdities, 
and at the same time express the legislative intent. 
The following rules for statutory construction ar" 
a pplieable: 
"In the interpretation of a statute, the lt>gi-:-
lature will be presumed to have insl'rted every 
part thereof for a purpose, and to haYP intended 
that every part of a statute should lw earrie,l 
into effect. The maxim, 'ut res magi:-:, qnaw 
pereat,' rectnires not merely that a statut<' Hhould 
be given effeet as a \i,hore, but that 0ffeet should be· given tu ea('h of its express provisions. A 
:2'! 
statute should not be construed in such manner 
as to render it partly ineffective or inefficient if 
another construction \vill make it effective. In-
deed, it is a cardinal rule of statutory construction 
that significance and effect should, if possible, 
without destroying the sense or effect of the law, 
be accorded every part of the act, including every 
Rection, paragraph, sentence, clause, phrase, and 
word. Under this rule, that construction i;-; 
favored which will render every word operative, 
rather than one which makes some words idle 
and nugatory. Sometimes, however, it is not 
possible, in arriving at the meaning of statutes, 
to give force and effect to every word and phra~e 
used. The court may not, in order to give effect 
to particular words, virtually destroy the mean-
ing of the entire context, that is, give them ~ 
significance which would be clearly repugnant to 
the statute looked at as a whole and destructive 
of its obvious intent. It has also been declared 
that if a word is used unnecessarily in one part 
of a statute, it may well be regarded as so used 
in another." (50 Am. Jur., Sec. 358, pp. 361-364.) 
"It is a general rule of interpretation that 
statutes should, if possible, be so construed as to 
make them practicable. Hence, a construction of 
an ambiguous statute should be avoided, which 
would render the application of the statute im-
practicable, or which would require the perform-
ance of a vain, idle, or futile thing, or attempt to 
require the performance of an impossible act. 
Indeed, a statute will not be construed so as to 
require the performance of an impossible act, if 
any other construction can be legitimately given 
it. There are some statutes, however, the utility 
of which may not be considered. The courts can 
only interpret a Rtatute aR framPd, nohvithstancl-
ing diliitulties in its application." (50 Am. Jttr., 
Sec . .16'0, p. 36'5.) 
'' Consisteney in statutes is of prime Impor-
tam~e, and in the absence of a showing to the 
eontrary, all laws an• presumed to be consistent 
with Paeh other. ~Where it is possible to do so, 
it is the duty of the courts, in the construetion 
ol' statutes, to harmonize and ref~onrile lavYs, and 
to adopt that construction of a statutory provision 
whieh harmonizes and reconciles it with other 
statutory provisions. A <~onstruction of a :,.;tatute 
whieh creates an inconsistency should be avoided 
"·hen a reasonable intl~rpretation can b<~ a<lopted 
vdtich will not do violence to the plain worcb of 
tlw ad aml will earry out tllP intention of Con-
gTPss. '' '' * In order that effeet may be given 
to every part of an act in accordance with tho 
legislative intent, all the language of the act 
must be brought into a<~eord. 'l'he various provi-
siom; of an aet shonld be rPad so that all may, 
if possible, have their due and conjoint effect 
witlwnt n'rmgnaney or inconsistency, so as to 
retHle r t lw sta 1 nt(~ a eonsisten t and harmonious 
whole. Hr>nee, "·lwre two constructions of a 
statute are possible, by one of which the entirt~ 
aet may he~ harmonious while the ather will 
create disconl between different provisions, the 
former should he adopted. Although the courts 
eannot add to, take from, or change the language 
of a statute to give effed to any supposed inten-
tion of the legislutun~, words and phrases may 
bf~ altered aml supl;lied when that is necessary 
to obviate n~pugnane;: and inconsistency and to 
give effect to the manifest intention of the legis-
lature. The legislative intention will prevail over 
thP litf'ra! import of particular terms, and will 
control the striet letter of the statute, where an 
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adherence to such strict letter would lead to 
contradictory provisions. * * * " (.50 Am. Jur., 
Sec. /36'3, pp .. '167-86'9.) 
''Particular statutory provisions may present 
;-;nell an inconsistency as cannot be harmonized 
or reconeilecl. H is obvious that effect cannot 
he given to all the provisions of a statute where 
some of them are inconsistent and irreconcilable. 
In such case, as in other cases, a construction is 
sought \\'hirh would give effec-t to the purpose ot' 
the statutP and the intention of the legislatur<>. 
·~ * * " (:W Am. Jnr., Sec . .'J(i4, pp . .'W.4-.'J70.) 
'' l t is a ('ardinal rnle of con::;truetion that 
;;;ignifiean<·e and effe(·t shall, if possible. be ac-
<·onled to every sedion, elause, word or part ol' 
the aet." {,?5 R.C.L. 1004.} 
·'The SP\'<'ral provisions of the statnte should 
IH• ('Onstrued togeillPr in th<• light of the general 
purpm:p and ohjPet of Ht<> aet and so as to give 
dfeet to tlw main intPnt and purpose of thP 
lt-gislatun• as tlH·rein t>xpr·es;;;e(l." (25 R.C./1. 
J()()f'.) 
'' .\n interpretation whieh defeats any of thP 
m:mi t'Pst pnrposes of the statute eannot he ae-
<·<>pt<'d." (:26 R.C.L. 1014.} 
ll sing these well e:,;tahlii:ilwd rules of eonstruetion 
as a basi:,; for ddPrruining the legislative intent in amend-
ing in 194;), N(•dion /fi-5-21, Utah Code 1943 to its presei1t 
form, it ii'l sPen that the legislature had in mind the de<'i-
. . ' 
sion of the Supreme Court in the McCarthy ease stlpr.-a~ 
and that it intended to codify the rule of that case by 1'<.'-
quiring that all applications for contract carrier's permits 
should be granted only after hearing, whereof notice had 
been given. rrlt.is purpose is clearly shown Ly the elirni-
nation of the phrase ''by any other person than those 
referred to above in this section", which was contained 
in the 1935 act (Sec. 9, Chapt. 65, Laws of Utah 1935 ). 
As to practice and procedure, the legislature made no 
distinction between those entitled to permits under the 
"grandfather" clause and late comers, but required in 
all cases that the permit be granted only after hearing· 
upon notice. With this purpose definitely ascertained, 
the task remains to discover a construction which will 
maintain the integrity of this legislative purpose, and 
at the same time reconcile the ''grandfather'' clause 
with the second paragraph of the section. In this connec-
tion, the excerpt from the McCarthy opinion above 
quoted is pertinent, and particularly the statement: 
"In the nature of the case, such permits 
[meaning permits issued without notice or hear-
ing] can only operate as prima facie evidence of 
the right of the permittee to operate thereunder. 
Least of all, can it be properly said that such a 
permit, issued upon application, excludes the 
right of a competitor to contend and to show to 
the Commission * * * that the permittee in his 
operations * * * has entered into regular competi-
tion with-let us say-common motor carriers 
* * *" (Italics supplied) 
That declaration suggests strongly a construction and 
interpretation of the statute which will attain the main 
objective of the legislature and at the same time make 
effective all provisions of the statute. It is believed, and 
it is hereby earnestly urged, that a reasonable meaning 
of the statute may be deduced as follows: 
(a) That all applications for a contract carrier's 
carrier's permit, whether by pl.'ef,erred persons 
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under the "grandfather" clause or by late 
comers into the tmnsportation field, must be 
set for hearing upon a date certain, and notice 
of the hearing be given; 
(b) That no contract carrier's permit shall issue 
until after a hearing in which persons adv,ersely 
affected may appear and submit evidence on 
their behalf, and cross-examine opposing wit-
nesses; 
(c) In the event there is a "full dress'' hearing held 
after interested parties have appeared in oppo-
sition, the Commission must, from the evidence, 
find the four conditions existing as set forth 
in the second paragraph of the statute before 
a permit may issue; 
(d) In determining the existence of such conditions, 
proof that the applicant is a preferred person 
under the "grandfather" clause will prima facie 
establish his right to a permit, and cast the 
burden of going forward with the proof upon 
his opponents to disestablish this prima facie 
right, the burden of proof remaining, however, 
in toto upon the applicant to establish the four 
conditions named in the statute. 
(e) If after the Commission has set the application 
for hearing upon a date certain and has given 
notice, no interested persons appear in opposi-
tion to the granting of the permit, proof that 
the applicant is a preferred person under the 
"grandfather" clause will ,entitle him to a permit. 
Under the foregoing construction, the "grandfather" 
elanse, in view of the 1945 amendment, does not confer 
upon an applicant a :;;uhRtantive right, hnt rather a pro-
eednral advantagE~. This procedural advantage is not a 
mere shadow Ol' chimera, hut is a p-roeess of vahw to an 
applic·ant in sr>rking a permit. It is an advantage well 
known to lr~p;nl pro<•edurP.~' 
''As an example, Section 8 0-12-4 Utah Code 1 9 43 provide~ that 
a transfer of a material part of a decedent's estate in the nature of 
a final distribution thereof, made by a decedent within thrPe year,; 
It is earnestly contended by the defendants that the 
foregoing construction and interpretation of this stat-
ute complies with recognized rules of statutory con-
struction; perpetuates the intention of the legislature; 
does no violence to the rights of the parties interested, 
but rather preserves the same and recognizes due procP-ss 
procedure, so strongly implied in the McCarthy decision, 
supra. 
A review of the record in this case reveals that tlH~ 
Commission recognized both the rule of thP McOartll,iJ 
decision and the mandates of the 1945 act. The plain-
tiffs' application was set for hearing upon a date eer-
tain, and all interested persons notified. The defendant 
carrier appeared in response to said notice, and con-
tested the application. The plaintiff primarily rested 
its case (mistakenly, we believe) upon its "grandfather" 
rights, as it does in these review proceedings. Substan-
tial evidence was submitted which enabled the Commis-
sion to make definite findings: (a) that the applicant 
had failed to show that existing transportation facilitie:-:; 
did not provide adequate or reasonable service, as re-
quired by Section 76-5-21, as amended; (b) that tl11: 
granting of the permit would d~tract from the business 
of the existing carriers, which would eventually impair 
rather than improve transportation service in the area 
proposed to be served; (c) that the defendant carrier 
is ready, ahle, and willing to render reasonable, adequatl~ 
prior to his death except a bona fide sale for a fair consideration, 
"shall be presumed to have been made in contemplation of death." 
Any lawyer is well aware of the. difficulties of overcoming this 
presumption or prima facie case in opposition to the tax authorities' 
purpose to tax such transfer. 
sennce to the an~a ·and the :-;hipper coven~d by tlw ap-
plieation; (d) that suffieient serviee is already availablt• 
in the an~a proposed to lw served by the applicant; and 
(e) that the granting of the applieation would be detri-
mental to th<· !Jest inten•sts of the people iu the area 
<'OYered by tlw applieation. 
In view of the foregoing, it is submittt~d that plain-
tiffs' <~onteution thai it was automati<·ally entitled to a 
euu traet earrier 's permit in the instant ease by virtue 
of preferred rights conferred upon it by the "grand-
fathPr" elanse, is without merit. 
H. 
PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO THE 
BENEFIT OF THE "GRANDFATHER" RIGHTS 
UNDER SECTION 76-5-21, UTAH CODE 194;J,AS 
AMENDED BY CHAP'l'ER 105, LAWS OF UTAH 
1945, BECAUSE (1) THEY WERE NOT A CON-
TRACT CARRIER ON JANUARY 1, 1940 AND 
(2) 'l'HEY ILLEGALLY TRANSPORTED SUGAR 
OVER PUBLIC HIGHWWAYS FORUTAH~IDAHO 
SUGAR COMPANY FROM WEST JORDAN, UTAH, 
TO SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, DURING THE 
PERIOD FROM MAY 8, 1945, TO THE DATE OF 
HEARING BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE 
COMMISSION IN THIS MATTER. 
l•~n·n though plaintiffs' eonstrudion of St~etion /fi-
;J-:21, Utah Code 1 !)4;), as amend<•d hy Chapt<·r 10;), La\\':-: 
oJ' { r(a!J 104:J, lw adopted, tiH• P\·idP!l('(' ill thi:-: ea.;e 
[H"o\·<'s thai tlwy \\"Pre orwrating on January 1, 1940 
under tltP "1 G mile" exemption and also that they had 
f 0 rtei t11d their right to elaim pri vil<•g<'S under tJt,~ 
"gran<lfatbPr" elause o l' the statute. The• testin1m1y 
of Oemgc A. Sim:-; anJ ElinP r A. Sims, wi tnPsse:-' 
on behalf of plaintiffs at the hearing before the 
Commission, hereinbefore set forth in the defendant 
carrier's supplemental statement of facts, abundantly 
demonstrates that the plaintiffs transported sugar for 
the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company upon the public high-
ways of Utah between the .West Jordan plant of the 
Sugar Company and Salt Lake City, Utah, during the 
period commencing May 8, 1945 and up to the date oi 
hearing before the Commission. Their testimony also 
shows without contradiction that the plaintiffs did not 
secure from the Commission a contract carrier's permit 
to cover this transportation. 
Chapter 105, Laws of Ut3:h 1945, also amended Sec-
tion 76-5-25 Utah Code 1943 by striking therefrom these 
two exemptions from the operation of the Motor Carrier::; 
Act: 
(a) "To contract motor carriers of property 
when operating wholly within the limits of an in-
corporated city or town and for a distance of not 
exceeding fifteen road miles beyond the corporate 
limits of the city or town in Utah in which the 
point of origin of any property or passenger 
movement is located or when operated within a 
radius of 15 miles from any point of origin out-
side of an incorporated city or town in Utah, and 
which movement either alone or in conjunction 
with another vehicle or vehicles is not a part of 
any journey or haul beyond said fifteen-mile 
limit;'' 
(i) "To the casual or occa::;ional transportation 
of persons or property for compensation by any 
person not regnlarly engaged in transportation 
by lllotor vel!ieleB as his or its principal occu-
patioll or husine:;;s." 
'The legal result of the repeal of the "15 mile" exemp-
tion formerly eontained in the 1935 act (Section 76-5-25 
['talt Code 1943) is described by Mr. Justice Latimer in 
t!Jp prevailing opinion in Rowley v. Public Sen:ice Corn-
mission of Utah, ______ Utah, ______ , 183 Pae. (2<1) 514, at 51~) 
as follows: 
''The effeet of these latter amendments was 
to bring under the control of the commission all 
(jarriers openfting within cities and towns and 
f'or a (listanee of not to exceed 15 miles beyond 
the l'Orporat<> limits, and also to the casual or 
oeea:;;ional opPrator who was opnrating but whose 
prineipnl lnu-;inPs:;; was not trau:-:portation." 
When Commit--:sioner Hacking interrogated both 1\lr·. 
I<~lmer L. Sim:;; and Mr. GeorgP A. Rims, witnesses for 
plaintiffs. ht- partieularly directed his questions as to 
the plaintiffs' eonduet of their business alter the effec-
tive date (.\lay 8, 194G) of Chapter lOG Laws of Utah 
1945, amending- Sections 76-5-21 and 76-5-25 Utah Codu 
1943. Both of thl'SP witn<'sses gave rPsponses that indi-
eated definitely that the plaintiffs had been using thP 
public hig-!J ways l'o I' tra llS porta tion o J' sugar for the 
lJtah-Idaho Sugar Company during said period withour 
securing- an~- eontrad eanier',: rwnnit therefol'. .1\11'. 
(}eorge A. Sirm;' testimon~· further indicates _that _the 
plaintiffs had prior to May 8, 1945, hauled the sugar 
nnder the "15 mile" pxemption contained in sub-para-
graph (a) of Section 7G-5-25 Utah Code• 1943 before it 
\Vas eliminated by the 1945 amendment. There is abso-
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lutely no evidence in the record that on January 1, 1940, 
or at any other time, the plaintiffs had obtained a con-
tract carrier's permit to handle sugar for the Utah-
Idaho Sugar Company. Conversely, the evidence shows 
without contradiction that the plaintiffs transported 
this sugar under the "15 mile" exemption, and that 
when that exemption was repealed on May 8, 1945, they 
did not make any effort to secure a contract carrier's 
permit. Rather, they continued operations without auth-
ority, and speciously explained such conduct at the 
hearing by stating they believe<! they had authority 
automatically to continue such service without specific 
written authority from the Commission. (R. 84) 
The evidence shows that plaintiffs were the holder 
of Contract Carrier Permit No. 212, as amended) datcJ 
February 23, 1939, issued in Case No. 1849 (R. 73, 125, 
126, 132) wherein the plaintiffs were authorized to trans-
port certain specific property for six identified con-
tractees (none of which was the Utah-Idaho Sugar Com-
pany) over several separate routes in the State of Utah. 
(R. 73, 75) There is no evidence that the plaintiffs were 
ever granted a "general contract carrier permit" such 
as suggested by Mr. Justice Wolfe in his concurring 
opinion in the McCarthy case, supra. (P. 226 of 184 
Pac. 2d) The evidence in fact shows that the plaintiffs 
had been granted permits covering services to be ren-
dered to six contractees over defined route:;;, none of 
which was the vVest ,Jordan-Salt Lake City route. Prior 
to the 1945 amendment, the plaintiffs had operated under 
the "15 mile" exemption, but upon the removal of this 
32 
1 
i 
exemption from Lhe law, the plaintiffs aulomatically 
eame under the rontrol of the Comission, and it was 
Uwir duly to apply at onee to the Commission for a 
<'Ontract earrier's permit eovcriug the transportation 
of sugar for the Utah-Idaho Sugar Compauy. 'l'he fail-
lHP or refusal of plaintiffs to :,;eenre this permit ma(k 
their transportation o I' sugar O\'P r publie h iglrways an 
illl•gal operation, and ln·ings it squarely \\·ithin thP rulP 
of the Rowley easP. 
SPr·tion /li-S-:21 l'tah ('odp HJ4:~, as atnt>ndl•d h,\' 
Chaptut· J()f) Laws of l'iah Hl4S, dPnoun('PS as unlawful 
th<' ad of an;· <"ontrad lllotor ea rrin in opPrating as 
stwh I'HtTier in intrastatP <·omtnen·<· withtHtt first having 
olliaim~d fi'Om tll<~ Commis:-;ion a rwnnit thPrPfor. "\l't<>r 
tl)(' n•rwal ot' thf~ ")f) mile" PX(·tuplion ou ~lay H, 1943, 
til<• plaintiffR in tram;porting :-;ugar for Utah-Idaho 
Nngar Company W<"l'<\ as guilt)· of violating the law a:-; 
HcJ\I'IP)T had hel•n. '!'hey had no right to usP the publi(' 
hig·lt\\'a~·s ol' l!tah for :om<·h purpose. 'l'he falla(~y or 
plaintiffs' position is demonstrated by this simple fae ... 
tnal statenwnt: 
(a) Since 1;epeal of the "15 mile" exemption, plain-
tiffs' transportation of sugar from \Vest Jordan to Salt 
Lake City could not reRi upon th(' "Hi mile" exemption. 
It \Vas gone. 
(b) Plaintiffs at no time held a general contract 
carrier's permit (assuming such type of p·ermit is author-
ized by law), but its contract carrier's permits covered 
contractees other than the Sugar Company and specific-
ally covered other route.". 
(c) The plaintiffs at no time obtained a contract 
carrier's permit for their sugar hauling operations. 
The plaintiffs continued their illegal operation::-; 
even after they filed their application for the permit now 
involved. Note the following exchange between Commis-
sioner Hacking and the witness Elmer L. Sims: 
''CoMMISSIONER HACKING: As I understand 
your testimony, you have rendered this service 
to the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company at West Jordan 
for some considerable period of time? 
A. Yes. 
CoM. HACKING: And are still rendering it. 
As you stated, you sent a truck out yesterday! 
A. Yes." (R. 84) 
There is a suggestion in the testimony of plaintiffs' 
witnesses that they had filed with the Commission a con-
tract with the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company other than 
the contract now involved in this action. (R. 71, 85) The 
contention of plaintiffs (R. 71, 85) that the mere filing 
of the other contract (if one existed; it was never found) 
with the Commission was a sufficient compliance with 
the law, is a ridiculous conception. The mere filing of a 
contract with the Commission is certainly not obtaining 
a permit. 
With respect to sugar hauling opeartions for the 
Utah-Idaho Sugar Company, the plaintiffs were not in 
a position to claim the benefits of the "grandfather" 
clause, either as a substantive or as a procedural right. 
First, because on January 1, 1940 they transported sugar 
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mtd<'l' tlu• "1:-J ntile" Pxemption. A.t tlw hearing they 
J"<·peatPdl:-· tnnde this elaim. This operation certainly 
,,. as 11 ot a <"On trad <·a niPr ope ration. Second, they had 
lw<~ll <·ngwz.·<'d si II<"<' }I a.\· ~' 1945 in an illegal orwra-
tion, awl lllldPr tlw doc-trine or tlw Rowley eas(' 
shonld lw dPni<·d the right to aP:-<Prt thP JH'i"dleges of th.~ 
· 'grandfntlH·r'' <~lanse. 'J'he Commission committed no 
error in its J'ailme to make a Jjnding regarding the 
statns of plaintiffs as a eontrad motor <'arrier on .Jann-
a ry 1, J 940. The absence of any su<'h finding from the 
n~eonl is wholly justified because plaintiffs on January 
l, 1940 operated under the "15 mile" exemption and 
also because of plaintiffs' illegal use of public highways 
of the fitate of Utah subsequent to May 8, 1945. 
Ill. 
THE DENIAL OF PLAINTIFFS' APPLICA-
TION FOR A CONTRACT CARRIER PERMIT 
WAS NOT AN ARBITRARY ACT OF THE COM-
MISSION, BUT WAS BASED UPON SUBSTAN-
TIAL EVIDENCE WHICH NEGATIVED PLAIN-
TIFFS' RlGR'l' 1'0 S\JCR PERMIT. 
Plaintiffs have argued in this litigation that even 
if their purported or alleged rights under the "grand-
father" clause are eliminated from consideration, the~· 
;.;uhmitted to the Commission substantial evidence which 
Pntitl<'d them to a coniraet carrier's permit. 'Phis is 
hut auotlwr way of asserting that the Finding~ of the 
Conuni:-;sion are not supported by substantial eYidene~~ 
and that its rl.0nial of the applieation was eaprieious and 
arbitrar.\·, alld therefore eonstituted error of which the 
Supn•mp Cunrt ma.\· tnk(' eogru11ant•e in these proeeed-
ings. With respect to the Supreme Court's authority on 
this aspect of the case, the following quotation from 
Goodrich vs. Public Service Commission et al, (----. Ut. 
______ , 198 Pac. 2d 975) is pertinent: 
"We have repeatedly held that in reviewing 
cases certified to this court from the Public Serv-
ice Commission on a statement of error that the 
Commission's report, findings, conclusions and 
order are unlawful, we are limited in our review 
to ascertaining whether or not the Commission 
had before it substantial evidence upon which to 
base its decision. Only in the event that we find 
the Commission acted arbitrarily, capriciously or 
unreasonably in denying applicant's petition can 
we set aside the order.'' 
It was the obligation of the plaintiffs to demon-
strate to the Commission by competent evidence that: 
(a) the highway over which the applicant desired to 
operate was not unduly burdened; (b) the granting of 
the application would not unduly interfere with the 
traveling public; (c) the granting of the application 
would not be detrimental to the best interests of the 
public of the State of Utah and/or to the localities 
served; and (d) the existing transportation facilities do 
not provide adequate or reasonable service ( ~ee. 76-5-21 
Utah Code 1943, as amended by Chapter JOt} Laws of 
Utah 1945 ). rrhe burden was upon thr plaintiffs to estah-
lish these conditions. 
However, the defendants will assume in their argu-
ment on this aspect of the case (without waiving their 
contention that the plaintiffs are not entitled to "grand-
father rights") that thf~ plaintiffs in this application 
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\\ un· a t~ouiract nwiur earner ou ,J auuary 1, Hl4U, awl 
were entilcd prima facie to a eontraei carrier's permit 
nnuer the construction of th<~ statute hereinbefore suh-
mitted under point I of this hrid. This problem is there-
fore approaeherl witl1 ih<· assumption that the plaintiffs, 
without submitting any further Pvidence than their con-
trad carrier status on .January 1, 1940, "made tht~ir 
('asp" a ll<1 east the burden on the defendant carrier of 
gomg· t'or\\'ard with the evidence to disestablish this 
prnua i'aei<• rig·ht to a permit. rl'his is a radieal eon-
<'P,ssion in plaintiffs' favor, hut the d<•fendant earrier 
makes this hypothdieal <~oneession in the full faith aud 
Jwli<>f that tlw eYidence snhmittt~d by it pins the admis-
sions of 11r. H. \V. Ansell, a \vitnpss on behalf ot' the 
plaintiffs, full~' supports tlw Findings of tht> Conuuis-
:-:ion . .\lr .• \nsp]] was the U<'nPral 'l'raffie Manager or 
tfw laah-fdaho Nugar Company, and th<> :--Iugar Com-
pan~- \\·ould Jw the dired Jwnef1ciary of any <'ontrad 
earrier's rwnuit granted plaintiffs. (R. 87) ln this eml-
neetion, 1\lr. Ans<•ll 's admission upon eross exawination 
1s most JH'rtill<'llt: 
"Q. Do I un<lerstand you only eall on :-:;all Lak(~ 
TmnsfPr in these rmergen<'ieB 'l 
A. ln general, yes. It might lw times whtm 
our offiec is rushed, and rather than ealling 
:.\f agna-Garfield and then \Vaiting for a while to 
see whether they can do it or not, they just want 
to :;:atisfy that man, anrl they f'all the Salt Lake 
'l ransfur Company. 
(l As a matter of fad, it is a <·ontinuous 
praetiee, isn't it, Mr. AnsPll, PllJPrgPney or no 
('JllPl'gPil<')'? 
A. No, I don't think so. I wouldn't say that. 
Q. Do you know? 
A. Well, I know that we endeavor to give the 
Magna-Garfield a good share of our business, oi 
the normal business, you might say. 
Q. Then you are representing to this Com-
mission that this contract really only becomes 
operative in these emergency periods; is that 
correct? 
A. In general. 
Q. \Vhy do you qualify it, in general~ Why 
that expression j? 
. 
A. \Vell, as l just said, something might come 
up after lunch, and the man wants his sugar 
delivered to him that day. 
Q. So, it is pretty much of a practic-e through-
out the year, isn't it? 
A. To the extent it could happen almost any 
time. 
Q. So, this isn't an emergency at all. It is 
a continuous process yon contemplate? 
* * * * * 
A. I have endeavored to show these things 
happen on a little unusual cirrumstaneP, and, in 
general, as I keep saying, we give the Magna-
Garfield a steady flow of business when they can 
give us the service we require. But if some occa-
sion has brought about necessity for quick service 
from West Jordan within the hour, then we give 
the business to the Salt Lake Transfer Company. 
Q. \Vell, now, with this new contract, if it is 
approved by the Commission and a permit issm~d, 
you are going to give the Salt Lake rrransfPr all 
the hm;inPss, aren't you'? 
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A. No, Umt it-l not tnH'. \\' c would ;.:till give 
thP l\lagna-<Jarii1•]d the hu:-;ine;.:s on whieh there 
i:-; no emerg<>Jl<'.'' J'or qniek fleliYer:·. 
Q. vVell, .IJOil hare no criticism of the handlin!J 
of the ship111e11ts l1.1J Ma.rnw d' Oatfield, thai .IJOil 
have gi1:en to them'? 
A. No; it lws been Ve!'Jf satisfactory. 
Q. Ycm h(LVe no criticism of its automotive 
equipmrnt il usrs in that respect? 
A. No. 
Q. Your wltole ('CJTltPJltion i..:, tilPll, nll·. 
Ansr>ll, that the common earrier hen· inn>lH•d 
<'amwt render this emergem·)·, i;.: that tlte tlwor:·:, 
which emergency ;.:ervice is brought about h:· 
comparativ<~ conditions~ 
A. 'rhat 's right, cannot rend<>r a s pPed.'' 
servir.t~, would probably l>e a lwt tf•r word 1 lulll 
'Pill(' q.!,'l'll<'_\' '. 
Q. And the handling of sugar doPs no! rc•-
quire any partie11lar t.''Pf' of automotive> equip-
ment, cine;.: it? 
A. No, c·X<~ept it ltas got to hc• h·pt l'ront tit\~ 
,,·eat!trr, of' <~our;.:l~. 
Q. Of course. And .IJOU hai'C 1111 r:omplai11f of 
the equifJIIIr'lll of !he l1la_cJJW-Oorfteld on /h({/ 
:-:eorr? 
A. I do no!." (ftalies ;.:npplied) (R. 104, 10:J, 
1 ()(), 107) 
'l'lte>rPI'ore, plaintiff:-~' 0\\'11 evi<LPJJ<'(' PNtabli~lws hP·' 
yond peraO\'Pil1nrP that thP d1•t'endani earriPr h;l;.: l'Pn-
J.ered to the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company a service which 
has been free from criticism, and which has been very 
satisfactory. Furthermore, Mr. Ansell admits that the 
Sugar Company has no complaint as to the type oi 
equipment used by the defendant carrier. It is weather 
proof equipment. It is obvious from Mr. Ansell's testi-
mony that the Sugar Company supported plaintiffs' ap-
plication on the single basis that it could obtain fro:r1 
the applicants a speedier service. The issue therefore 
becomes a narrow one, and that is whether the defendant 
carrier proved that it can render this speedier service. 
The evidence on behalf of the defendant carrier definitely 
proves that it has both the equipment and the personnel 
to render this speediPr service. The President of the 
defendant carrier denied the assertion that his com-
pany was not able to rPnder the Sugar Company the 
service required by it. (R. 144, 145, 151) He describeJ. 
at length the equipment maintained and operated by the 
defendant carrier. The company maintains a regular 
schedule to Bingham and Oarfwld. (R. 142) The regu-
larly scheduled trucks leave ~aJt Lake at 10:00 A.M. 
each week-day morning, but his company is prepared to 
furnish other and additional trucks in any emergency. 
( R. 153) Three trucks are operated on !.he Sal lLh. 
Bingham route, and one on the Salt Lake-Garfield route. 
(R. 153) The Company owns eight trucks at pres en 
and employs six drivers, but it has available sources t;J 
secure other automotive equipment upon immediate de-
mand, and has available two emergency drivers. (R. 142, 
143) In the knowledge of the PrPsideni there was only 
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one instanee of the d<>fendaHt <·arrier's failure lo emuply 
\Yith the Sugar Company's request, and that was a d<"-
mand late in the afternoon for a delivery within a half 
hour from the call. The President explained to the Sugar 
Company that he could not meet the demand for a de-
livery within the half hour, but was prepared to make it 
within two hours. (R. 144) No employee of the defendant 
carrier is authorized to refuse any shipments. (R. 157, 
158) The haulage of sugar from the \Vest Jordan fac-
tory is on the Salt Lake-Bingham operation of defend-
ant carrier. (R. 152) On the return trip from Bingham 
these trucks are authorized to make "pickups" at inter-
mediate points. (R. 156) 'l'he back haul is very small, 
and a stop at the \Vest .Jordan factory to pick up Ll 
shipm<~nt would be entirely possible. (R. 156) If the 
8 ugar (; ornpany requires full t ruek loads to lw mo n~d, 
the defen<lant carriPr is prepared, upon notification, t•l 
provide sLH·h truek equipment. (R 151) 'l'he dd<~ndan~ 
enniPJ' is pl'PJlarP<l at all time:,.; to renrler the Sugar Conl-
pany th<~ qni!'k delin~ries of large quantities of sugar to 
Salt Lake City. (R. 145) Speci1ically, the PrPsident of dc·-
fenrlant company denie<l the testimony of tlw Sugar 
Company witness that the defenrlant carrier had not 
been able to rendrr the service required by the Sugar 
Company, in view of eompetiti,·e conditions in Salt Lake 
City. ( R. 145) lle ass<~rtP<l that his company was able 
and willing to handle the sanw quantities of sugar as 
have h<~en handl<•d by the HJ1I)licants, and to r<•ndPr tlw 
transportation :-:<'rviee with the f'ame speud ancl <'ffi<'ieney 
as the apTJ11eantf;. (R 145) 
, 
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It is not the task of the Supreme Court to weigh 
evidence or resolve confiicts in evidence. Its function 
in reviewing cases of this type is to determine whether 
there was substantial eidence before the Commission to 
support its findings. Conflicts in the evidence as to 
whether the defendant carrier was ready, willing and 
able to render the so-called speedier service were for 
the Commission alone to resolve. By its findings the 
Commission resolved this issue against the plaintiffs. 
At this hearing there was no issue concerning the bur-
dening of the West Jordan-Salt Lake highway, or of 
undue interference with the traveling public. The evi-
dence was directed solely to the question whether the 
granting of the application would be detrimental to the 
best interests of the State of Utah and/or to the locali-
ties to be served, and as to whether the existing trans-
portation facilities provide adequate and reasonable 
service. There was substantial evidence before the Com-
mission from which it could reasonably find that the 
transportation facilities offered hy the defr~ndant ~ar­
rier were and would be adequate and reasonahlP, en~n 
considering the extraordinary demand of tlw 8ugar 
Company for "speedier service." '!'he evidence also 
justified the Commission in reaching the conclusion that 
public interest would he damaged if it granted the 1'<'-
questecl permit. In this connection the quotation from 
People's Transit Company v. Henshaw (8 Cir., 20 F('rl. 
2cl 87 at p. 90) quoted in th(' Mrnarthv opinion, snpra, 
is appropriate: 
"The results of such comp0tition, whf'rP t;hen~ 
is not suffieient business to snstain all of tlw 
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competitors, i:,; that a season of experience causes 
all or some to drop out or compels the purchase 
of competitors ( u~ually at exaggerated amounts), 
thus causing an increase of capital expenditure 
of the purchasers upon which the charges to the 
public must be based and thereby increaf'ed. 
"These com;iderations, and others, amply 
ju~tify differences to protect and preserve th,, 
t•xisting permanent system. No new system ha~ 
a legal right to destroy sueh existing system all<l 
have the public at its merey. rrhe public welfare 
is not ::;erved, but harmed thereb~'· The publie 
may protect itself against such results. Nor can 
;my th0or,\' of free competition change this situa-
tion. Competition is recognized and encouraged 
for the sole rea:son that it is supposed to result 
in the public good. But competition is not neces-
sarily unrestrainable. It cannot be allowed to 
harm the very public it was designed to proteet 
and aiJ. It may be restrained for the public wel-
fare just the same as monopoly may be restrained 
or as competition may be left unrestrained. The 
test in each instance is the public good. ·where 
the restraint upon competition is for the public 
good, it is sustainable just as restraint upon 
freedom of action by the individual is valid where 
for the public good. Such is the basis of and the 
reason for the entire poliee power.'' 
1. It will be detrimental to the best interests of 
the public and to the localities served, to grant 
the permit to plaintiffs. 
The decision in the instant case may in a general 
manner set a precedent with respect to motor vehicle 
transportation in the State of Utah, and far-reaching 
consequences may result therefrom. The problem pre-
senteJ to the Commission was an exeeeclingly important 
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one, not only to the plaintiffs, Uw defendant ear-
ner of Utah-Idaho Sugar Company but also to 
the puhlic at large. There 1s fundamentally 111-
volved the responsibility of the Public Service Com-
mission with respect to its administration of the ae~ 
governing transportation by motor vehicles. One of the 
principal purposes of the act is to insure that the public 
will secure an efficient permanent transportation service, 
whether that service be rendered by common or contraet 
carriers. It is the duty of the Commission to administer 
the law with wisdom and foresight, to the end that the 
public may be best served. The spirit of the act envisions 
a state-wide transportation system composed of numer-
ous units, be they either common or contract carriers, 
who are financially respons:ble and are ready, willing 
and able to furnish to the public the service that it de-
serves and requires. While neither certificates of con-
venience and necessity nor contract carrier permits 
grant any monopoly, and certainly do not vest in the 
recipients thereof any right to be free from competition 
or to hold a monopoly against the public, there exi~ts 
intrinsically in the regulatory provisions of the statute 
the purpose and intention of the legislature to prevent 
uncontrolled competition between motor carriers of such 
nature as would eventually either seriously impair trans-
portation facilities or perhaps utterly destroy them. By 
vesting in the Commission a controlled: discretion as· ttJ 
either granting or withholding certificates and permit::-;, 
dependent :upon circumstances, the legislature evinced 
its intc~ntion that motor vPhif'le transportation should 
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be so regulated as to prevent the evils of a monopoly on 
the one hand and the destructive influence of uncontrolled 
competition on the other. It is by striking a happy me--
dium between the two extremes that the Commissio11 
achieves the purpose of the law. An administrative 
body like the Conuni~Rion is best qualified to weigh and 
measur(~ the fact~ and ('in~um::;taneP~ of a gin~n ease, tn 
onler to strike this balance. 
It vwuld be lawful for the Commission, under facts 
and circmnstances which control the exercise of its dis-
eretion, to i::;sue a C'ontract carrier permit over the iden-
tical route ot', and in competition with a previously auth-~ 
ori7,ed common carrier. The law did not intend that a 
('OllUHon carrier holding a Certificate ~hould have, for 
all time, a monopoly on the transportation over the 
route serve(l by it, but this is not necessarily justifica-
tion for licensing competing carriers where there is no 
public interest involved. The Supreme Court in its de-
cision in the case of Utah Light d!; Traction Company 1'. 
Public Service Cornrnission of Utah, (101 Ut. 9!1; 118 
Pac. 2cl 68:~ at 690) stated : 
" * '~ * but when a territory is satisfactorily 
serviced and its transportation facilities are ample, 
a duplication of such service, which unfairly inter-
feres with existing carriers rnay undermine and 
weaken the transportation setup generally, anrl 
thtts deprive the public of an effic,ient, pernwnf'11t 
service." 
The defendant can·i(~r is the ownPr nncl holder of a 
Certificate of CfiHvenien('e a11il~ Nec-~ssit~: issuPd h;v tlw 
Pnblie Serviee Commission, authorizing it 1o C'any -on 
the business of a common earner between Salt Lake 
City and Bingham, Utah, over the highways stated in 
said Certificate. The West Jordan factory of the Sugar 
Company is served by this common carrier route. There 
is a public necessity existing for the maintenance of a 
motor vehicle common carrier operation between Salt 
Lake and Bingham. At the latter point is conducted on,• 
of the most important industriPs in the State of Utah, 
and the service of that community by an efficient, finan-
cially responsible common motor carrier is of great im-
portance, not only to Bingham and Salt Lake City, but 
also to the public at large. While Bingham is served by 
common carriers by rail, operations of the defendant 
carrier over a long period of time have proved the fad 
that there does exist a necessity and demand for motor 
vehicle carrier servicP. 'l'he Commission, by granting 
the Certificate to the defendant earrier, has in effect 
found such fact. The maintenance of such service in an 
efficient manner, i::o of course dependent primarily upon 
the finaueial returns received by the defendant carrier, 
and these returns are dependent upon the volume of 
business ari::oing not only in Salt Lake City and Bing-
ham, but also along its route. The business of the Sugar 
Company in the movement of sugar to Salt Lake City 
from its West Jordan factory is a legitimate contribu-
tion to the financial welfare of defendant carrier. Prirria 
facie this business belongs to the common carriers which 
serve the fadory, provided, of course, that their service 
is adequate. The defendant carrier is ready, willing and 
able to furnish the service to the Sugar Company whicl1 
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will meet its demands and requirements, resultant upon 
the highly competitive conditions revealed by the evi-
dence. The testimony of the Sugar Company witness in 
its fullest thrust serves only to establish the fact that 
should this permit be granted, the Sugar Company will 
be given additional choice of carriers. But this fact 
does not establish the ultimate fact which must be found 
by the Commission, viz: that it will not be detrimental 
to the best interests of the people and of the localities 
to be served if such permit is granted. It is vigorously 
urged by the defendants that there is no basis in fact to 
justify the Commission in introducing competition 1n 
the hauling of sugar between West Jordan and Salt 
Lake City as against the defendant carrier. The result 
of granting such permit would only be to subtract from 
the defendant carrier a certain volume of business in 
order to give the Sugar Company a further choice of 
carriers. rrhe granting of the permit might very well 
establish a pattern for the Commission in similar cases 
which are sure to arise. Let there be a certain number 
of incidents, destructive competition between carirers 
will be tmcouraged rather than restrained as contem-
plated by the law. rl'he mere c-onvenience of one shipper 
along a common carrier route is not sufficient reason 
to justify the Commission in introducing competition 
against its previously licensed common carrier where 
there is no evidence that the public at large will benefit 
from the same. 
The crux of the plaintiffs' case is simply this: The 
Sugar Company encounters vigorous competitiOn trorn 
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other sugar companies which maintain large stocks or 
sugar in Salt Lake City, and it seeks to meet this compe-
tition by securing from the plaintiffs a transportatiOn 
service which the evidence fails to prove as being neces-
sary, but which simply serves the convenience of the 
Sugar Company. It is the contention of defendants that 
such evidence utterly fails to support a finding that the 
granting of the application would not be detrimental tu 
the best interests of the peopl eand of the localities 
served. If the mere convenience of one shipper on de-
fendant carrier's route is reason for the Commission 
introducing competition against it, like convenience of 
other shippers, multiplied several times, may easily 
destroy defendant carrier's business. This is the exact 
type of competition which the statute intende(l the Com-
mission to control or restrict. Let it he suppose(! that 
other owners of motor vc>hiclPs apply to the Commission 
frir eontract canier pc>rmib over defendant canif'r's 
route, and hasc> their applieations upon assPrtPd eom'en-
wnee of ('Prtain otlwr shipp<>rs. \Vhat will tlwn lw tlw 
attitude o[' the Commission when it is faeC>rl ·with the 
prohlem of eitlwr serving the <'Onveni<>m·e of thP shipper,.;, 
or weakening tlw ahilit)' of the dcfemlant carrier to IWT'-
form its public sPrviec "I 'rlw time to stop such procl'ss 
is at the pres(mt. 'l'}w pnhlie good can he best S<'l'VPtl 
hy sustaining defendant earrier in its common carrier 
operation over the route involved. 
2. Existing transportation facilities operated by 
defendant carrier provide adequate and reason-
able service over its route. 
The Commission, in order to justify the issuance of 
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a permit to plaintiffs, must also find that existing tram;-
portation facilities over the Salt Lake-Bingham route do 
not provide adequate or reasonable service. The evi-
dence in this case does not even suggest that the defendant 
carrier has failed in any respect in the performance of 
its duties as common carrier over the route involved. 
No complaint has been registered against defendent car-
rier for its failure to serve the public. The Sugar Com-
pany witness at the hearing frankly stated that the basis 
of the application was solely a question of speedier 
rather than emergency service. In other words, there 
Llc:i .1 ,n::e admiss:on by this witness that defendant 
carrier is ready, willing and able to render even the so-
called emergency service to the Sugar Company. Ap-
parently the only criticism which the Sugar Company 
could make against defendant carrier's service was the 
question of time. 'l'here is not a scintilla of evidence in 
the record that defendant carrier does not possess ade-
quate automotive equipment nor the necessary personnel 
to operate the equipment. The testimony of the Presi-
dent of the defendant carrier, assuring the Commission 
of the ability of his company to perform its functions 
as common carrier, stands uncontradicted, and even the 
Sugar Company witnes:-: did not dispute this statement. 
The flpfendant carrier atlmitted frankly that there had 
been one occasion when tlH• Sugar Company requested 
a movement of sugar within a half hour's time, and due to 
~'\-r~\\lli':'.\1:\n~~'i'> tb.~n 1H'~V\:\iling tb.~ cani~T n~q_uesteu 
\'N\J \\\J\\"1:~, \\.m~. '\'\\.~ \:\\:l\.\\.\1 o\ \\I.e ue1 en\lan\ can\.e-r to 
\-\eTVl' \\w lYn\)\\e nw\ aho to ;;~~1·v~ t\w. ~np;aT ComiJan1 
4!) 
must :-:tami a:-: a deiinit<• l'acl in this rase. The President 
of thP defendant earri.er dpc)ar<~d that IJis C~ompany was 
in a position, upon dc'lllalld of thP Rugar Company, to 
di:-:pateh Pxtra trnek:-: in ordPr to effec-t this "speedy" 
cleliY<·ry of sugar into Ralt LakP. It is impossible, there-
fore•, to torture from this P\'idenc~e a finding that exist-
ing tran:-:portatlou faeilities, as fnrnishcd by c1efendant 
<"arrier, do not provide adequate or reasonable service 
for the shippers along its route, be they the public in 
general or the Sugar Company in particular. There is 
no particular conHict of evidence in this ease, when it is 
carefully analyzed and considered. Unless the Commis-
sion could find that defendant earrier's transportation 
facilities now and in the future do not provide adequate 
and reasonable serYice, it is not authorized to grant the 
plaintiffs' application. 
'I'he defendants earnestly submit to the Court that 
the Commission committed no error in denying plain-
tiffs' application for a contract carrier permit to serve 
the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company from its West Jordan 
Plant. 
Respedfnlly :mbmitted, 
F'RANKLIN RITER, 
Attorney faT Defendant 
Magna-Garfield Truck Lin!' 
CLINTON D. VERNON, 
Attorney Gcn!'ral nf Utah 
MARK_ K. BOYLE~ 
Assistant Attor·ne!J Ue1wraf 
Attorneys for Public Sen·ice 
Commission of Utah 
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